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Abstract 
The COVID-19 pandemic created needs for a) estimating the existing airborne risk of infection from 
SARS-CoV-2 in existing facilities and new designs, and b) estimating and comparing the impacts of 
engineering and behavioural strategies for contextually reducing that risk. This paper presents the 
development of a web application to meet these needs, the Facility Infection Risk Estimator™,1 and its 
underlying Wells-Riley based model. The model specifically estimates a) the removal efficiencies of 
various settling, ventilation, filtration, and virus inactivation strategies and b) the associated probability 
of infection given the room physical parameters and number of individuals infected present with either 
influenza or SARS-CoV-2. A review of the underlying calculations and associated literature is provided, 
along with the model’s validation against two documented spreading events. The error between 
modelled and actual number of additional people infected, normalized by the number of uninfected 
people present, ranged from roughly -18.4% to +9.7%. The more certain one can be regarding the input 
parameters (such as for new designs or existing buildings with adequate field verification), the smaller 
these normalized errors will be, likely less than ±15%, making it useful for comparing the impacts of 
different risk mitigation strategies focused on airborne transmission. 
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Introduction 
At the beginning of the pandemic in early 2020, there was an expressed need from various building 
owners, facility managers, occupants, and AEC industry consultants to help evaluate the relative 
contribution of different interior COVID-19 risk mitigation strategies. There was a lack of easily 
accessible tools and other resources for comparing and ranking different engineering / behavioural 
strategies (e.g., increased ventilation, filtration, mask wearing, de-densifying, germicidal UV 
technologies, etc.) for a given context based on both a) removal efficiency and b) the probability of 
infection. The model presented in this paper and its web-based application1 were developed specifically 
to contextually compare and rank available influenza and SARS-CoV-2 mitigation strategies for making 
any built environment safer with respect to far-field virus-containing aerosols. Other modes of 
transmission exist with varying degrees of relevance for different pathogens, such as fomite or direct 
physical contact. Additional risk mitigation strategies are associated with these other modes of 
transmission, such as surface cleaning, which are not included in this model. However, the consensus 
among many scientists at this point is that the dominant route of transmission of SARS-CoV-2 is 
airborne.2 There is increasing evidence that this also applies to Influenza and other respiratory 
viruses,3,4,5 further indicating a need for tools capable of evaluating the risk mitigation potential relative 
to airborne transmission. 
Airborne in this case refers to the transmission of viral particles or other pathogens from an infected 
individual through the air to an uninfected individual who inhales a quantity of particles sufficient to 
result in infection. Aerosols expelled from the infected individual act as the transport “vehicles” for the 
pathogens and depending on their size and environmental conditions, may float in the air for hours or 
even days. Aerosol science indicates that drops of respiratory fluid approximately 100 μm and less in 
diameter may float and evaporate faster than they fall to the ground (though it’s not a hard boundary),6 
and therefore for the purposes of this paper are termed aerosols (sometimes labelled droplet nuclei). 
For the purposes of this paper, respiratory fluid larger than 100 μm in diameter are labelled droplets and 
will generally fall to the ground faster than they evaporate.  
Far-field aerosols refer to aerosols beyond six feet from an infected person, and their concentration 
level is generally closer to the whole room average aerosol concentration level than for near-field 
aerosols.7 Near-field aerosols refer to aerosols within three to six feet of an infected person and occur at 
higher concentration levels than far-field aerosols (though as they dissipate throughout the room, they 
eventually become far-field aerosols). Far-field aerosols are impacted more than near-field aerosols by 
most of the mitigation strategies focused on by this model which also have very little to no impact on 
droplets (with settling and masks being the notable exception). 
The objectives of this study are to (1) provide a detailed review on the mathematical models and the 
published data that describe droplet / aerosol generation and quantum generation of an infected 
occupant, removal and inactivation mechanisms and the corresponding infection risk reduction of 
different strategies; (2) develop a comprehensive model that can compare and rank those solutions; (3) 
validate the model against two documented super-spreading events of SARS-CoV-2 as well as (4) assess 
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the model’s general effectiveness. The authors also discussed the model’s limitations as well as its 
assumptions and justifications.  
Modelling aerosol transmission and literature review  
The probability of infection calculations used by the model of the Facility Infection Risk Estimator™1 are 
based on a modified version of the Wells-Riley model of infection.8,9 The starting point9 for this model 
includes removal terms for ventilation, building system filtration, and settling. Removal terms for 
portable air cleaners, masks, inactivation from RH, and inactivation from upper room UVGI (ultraviolet 
germicidal irradiation) were subsequently added. The modified formula is Equation (1): 
● 𝑃 = [1 −
exp( 
−(𝑞∗𝐼∗𝑝∗𝑠∗𝑡)  
V∗ (ksettling + λventilation + kfiltration + kRHinactivation + kGUVinactivation+ kaircleaner  + kmask)
)] ∗
 vadjusted               (1) 
○ P = probability of infection 
○ q = quantum of infection (quanta generation rate), discussed further below 
○ I = number of infected individuals, discussed further below 
○ p = pulmonary ventilation rate, discussed further below 
○ s = modified p scaling factor for masks, discussed further below 
○ t = time of exposure, discussed further below 
○ V = volume of the room/space. 
○ ksettling = settling removal factor, discussed further below 
○ λventilation = ventilation removal factor, discussed further below 
○ kfiltration = building system filtration removal factor, discussed further below 
○ kRHinactivationIVA or kRHinactivationSC2 = RH inactivation removal factor, discussed further below 
○ kUVGIinactivationIVA or kUVGIinactivationSC2 = upper room UVGI inactivation removal factor, 
discussed further below 
○ λaircleaner = portable air cleaner removal factor, discussed further below 
○ kmask = mask removal factor, discussed further below 
○ vadjusted = adjusted vaccination factor, discussed further below 
Quantum of infection 
The Wells-Riley model is “… based on a concept of ‘quantum of infection, whereby the rate of 
generation of infectious airborne particles (or quanta - q) can be used to model the likelihood of an 
individual in a steady-state well-mixed indoor environment being exposed to the infectious particles and 
subsequently succumbing to infection.”9 
The quanta generation rate, q, is a “hypothetical infectious dose unit” that is typically estimated using 
epidemiological studies. This single number, in units of 1/hr, is an amalgamation of “... the amount of 
particles generated over time and the infectivity of particles, which also inherently captures 
susceptibility of individuals and particle size effects such as the probability of deposition in relevant 
regions of the respiratory system” and must be determined for each pathogen.8 
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This model varies the quanta per hour by selected activity level and expiratory event, for either 
influenza or SARS-CoV-2. Both activity level, primarily through breathing (or pulmonary ventilation) 
rates, and expiratory means (speaking, breathing, coughing, etc.) influence the initial size and quantity 
of the virus-containing droplets / aerosols, the varying concentration levels of virus particles within the 
droplets / aerosols, the potential for a non-infected individual to breathe them in, and the potential that 
they will reach deep enough in the lungs to cause an infection. Therefore, they impact the quantum of 
infection value. 
Table 1: Quantum generation rate estimate (quanta per hour) 
Activity 
Influenza Quantum Generation Rate 
Estimate (Quanta per hour) 
SARS-CoV-2 Quantum Generation Rate 











Breathing / Resting 3.2 35.0 68.0 4.0 15.8 28.0 
Speaking, Coughing, or Sneezing / 
Resting 
6.6 72.3 140.5 16.0 50.2 85.7 
Loudly Speaking or Singing / 
Resting 
29.6 324.2 630.0 97.0 382.5 679.0 
Breathing / Light 3.5 38.5 74.8 4.4 17.4 30.8 
Speaking, Coughing, or Sneezing / 
Light 
7.3 79.5 154.6 21.0 65.9 112.5 
Loudly Speaking or Singing / Light 32.6 356.6 693.0 134.0 528.5 938.0 
Breathing / Moderate 4.6 49.9 96.9 5.7 22.5 39.9 
Speaking, Coughing, or Sneezing / 
Moderate 
9.4 103.0 200.2 26.5 83.2 142.0 
Loudly Speaking or Singing / 
Moderate 
42.2 462.0 897.8 170.0 670.4 1190.0 
Breathing / Heavy 10.6 116.3 226.1 13.3 52.5 93.1 
Speaking, Coughing, or Sneezing / 
Heavy 
22.0 240.4 467.2 63.7 199.9 341.3 
Loudly Speaking or Singing / Heavy 98.6 1077.9 2094.8 408.0 1609.0 2856.0 
 
Table 1 above lists the quantum generation rates by expiratory means / activity level for both influenza 
and SARS-CoV-2 that are used in this model. In addition, separate values are provided for low, medium, 
and high shedders. These values are taken directly from and/or estimated from the values and sources 
listed in Table 2 as well as the Airborne Infection Risk Calculator manual.10 Due to conflicting data and 
opinions in the research relative to varying quantum generation rates between adults and children,11,12 
the model currently assumes the same rate for both children and adults.  
The model allows the user to select from the following expiratory means: Breathing, Speaking, Loudly 
Speaking or Singing, Coughing, and Sneezing. These specific categories were used to coordinate the 
quanta generation by expiratory means with the droplet / aerosol size ranges produced by expiratory 
means (discussed below in the Settling Removal Factor section). The following activity levels are 
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available to select from: Resting (sitting, reading, sleeping, and watching TV), Light (standing and most 
domestic or office work), Moderate (climbing stairs and light exercise), and Heavy (vigorous exercise). 
These specific categories were used to coordinate the quanta generation by activity level with 
pulmonary ventilation rates, discussed further below. 
Table 2: Referenced quantum generation rate studies 
Activity Virus 
Quantum Generation Rate Estimate 
(Quanta per hour) 
Notes 
Breathing / Sitting influenza 15 - 12813 
Highly infectious / 
superspreader range 
Breathing / Sitting influenza <3.2 - 2014 High degree of uncertainty 
Breathing / Sitting influenza LR: 15; IR: 76.18; HR: 12815 LR, IR, HR - low, intermediate, high risk 
Breathing / Sitting influenza 51516 Airflight Outbreak / highly infectious 
Breathing / Sitting influenza 0.17 - 63017 LR/symptomatic to HR/asymptomatic 
Breathing / Sitting influenza 33.9 - 67.811 
No indication of level of risk / 
superspreader 
Breathing / Sitting influenza 68.6718 Mean value of Rudnick and Milton13 - HR 
Breathing / Sitting SARS-CoV-2 <119 Symptomatic infectious subject 
Vocalization / 
Light Activity 
SARS-CoV-2 >100 (1030)19 
Asymptomatic infectious subject; 
walking slowly 
Speaking / Light 
Activity 
SARS-CoV-2 14219 
Asymptomatic infectious subject; worst 
case 
Breathing / Sitting SARS-CoV-2 LR: 11.4; IR: 28.94; HR: 295.515 Using SARS-CoV-1 as a proxy 
Breathing / Sitting SARS-CoV-2 0.3620 
Asymptomatic subject; Assuming low 
risk; Preprint 
Breathing / Heavy 
Activity 
SARS-CoV-2 2.420 
Asymptomatic subject; Assuming low 
risk; Preprint 
Speaking / Light 
Activity 
SARS-CoV-2 4.920 
Asymptomatic subject; Assuming low 
risk; Preprint 
Singing / Light 
Activity 
SARS-CoV-2 3120 
Asymptomatic subject; Assuming low 
risk; Preprint 
Singing / Light 
Activity 
SARS-CoV-2 970 [680-1190]21 
Asymptomatic; High Risk 
(superspreader); Preprint 
? (Breathing / 
Sitting) 
SARS-CoV-2 14 - 4822 
Fitted quantum generation rate w/ R0; 
Preprint 
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Oral Breathing 
(Lecturing) 
SARS-CoV-2 4.412 Assuming low risk 
Speaking 
(Lecturing) 




SARS-CoV-2 13412 Assuming low risk 
Oral Breathing / 
Sitting (Student) 
SARS-CoV-2 412 Assuming low risk 
Speaking / Sitting 
(Student) 
SARS-CoV-2 1612 Assuming low risk 
Loud Speaking 
(sitting) / singing 
SARS-CoV-2 9712 Assuming low risk 
 
Number of infected individuals 
The model allows the option of selecting one or more infected individuals. Each infected individual is 
assumed to have the same expiratory means, activity level, quantum of infection, and pulmonary 
ventilation rate.   
Pulmonary ventilation (breathing) 
Breathing rate is important to consider as it impacts the amount of virus potentially inhaled. It is also 
important to factor in the variation between adults and children. Adult and child pulmonary ventilation 
rates by activity level are determined using Table 6-31 from the EPA’s Exposure Factors Handbook.23 The 
Total Daily IR (inhalation rate) value for an adult average, divided by 24 hours, was used to provide the 
adult pulmonary ventilation rate for these calculations, representing ages 18 and older. The Total Daily 
IR value for a 10-year-old child, divided by 24 hours, was used to provide the child pulmonary ventilation 
rate for these calculations, representing ages less than 18 years of age.  
Modified p scaling factor (masks) 
The mask effective efficiency value, discussed further below in the Removal and Inactivation Factors 
section, is used to calculate a scaling factor that scales the rate at which quanta of infection are 
breathed in as a result of wearing a mask.24 This is described by Equation (2) 
● modified p scaling factor(s) = 1 − (mask effective efficiency ∗ % non −
infected wearing a mask)         (2) 
The unmodified p scaling factor (1 – mask effective efficiency)24 was modified to account for the 
potential that not all non-infected individuals are wearing a mask. The model allows one to input the 
percentage of infected and non-infected individuals wearing a mask. The unmodified p scaling factor 
values used for the different mask types are listed below in Table 5, discussed in the Removal and 
Inactivation Factors section. 
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Time of exposure 
The model allows one to enter the time of exposure in hours. Exposure time will vary by a) facility type, 
b) the different occupants present in the facility, and c) the different activities they undertake during the 
day. For example, if an infected individual is present in a room, the exposure time of elementary 
students could be significantly more than an office worker meeting with an infected coworker for 20 
minutes in a conference room.  
Removal and inactivation factors 
Research indicates aerosol transmission is likely a predominant route for the transmission of many 
viruses,8,25,26 including influenza and SARS-CoV-2. Reducing the threat from virus-containing aerosols 
indoors, once the virus particles have been expirated from an infected person, is accomplished by 
removing or inactivating them before non-infected individuals have an opportunity to inhale them. The 
removal and inactivation mechanisms addressed in this model include settling (via gravity), ventilation 
(via outdoor air), filtration (via the building HVAC system, portable air cleaners, and/or mask wearing), 
and virus inactivation (via relative humidity and/or upper room UVGI). Each of these is discussed in more 
detail below. 
Settling removal factor 
Environmental conditions impact the rate of settlement due to gravity. Air flow may keep smaller 
droplets / aerosols in the air longer and relative humidity (RH) plays a large role in the size of the 
droplets / aerosols after leaving the infected host.26,27 Droplets evaporate faster at lower RH levels, 
increasing their likelihood of staying aloft longer. Temperature also affects settling velocity through its 
impact on the dynamic viscosity of air; the warmer the temperature the higher the dynamic viscosity 
and the slower the settling velocity. As the dynamic viscosity of air doesn’t vary significantly over the 
narrow temperature setpoint range found in most occupied spaces (68OF - 76OF (20OC - 24.4OC)),28 the 
dynamic viscosity for a temperature of 72.5OF (22.5OC) at one atmosphere of pressure is used for this 
model. 
The means of expiration must also be considered because they impact the quantity and size of virus-
containing droplets / aerosols that are released from an infected individual. This model uses a weighted 
average initial diameter for these droplets / aerosols (immediately after expiration) to estimate the 
removal efficiency associated with settling and the associated impact on the probability of infection. 
Table 3 provides the average initial droplet / aerosol diameters used by this model for the following 
expiratory means: breathing, speaking normally, speaking loudly, singing, coughing, and sneezing, based 
on the references listed. 
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Breathing Average 0.8   1.5 












































Speaking Normal Average w/ O-mode 2.4   4.8 
Speaking Normal Average w/out O-mode 1.0   2.0 
Speaking Loudly Average 1.3   2.5 















Singing Average 1.0   2.1 
















0.3-20+ Cough 0.8 40% 0.8 54% 123.0 6%         8.1 Equil. 16.333 
0.3-20+ Cough 0.8 43% 0.8 57%             0.8 Equil. 1.633 
Coughing Average w/ O-mode 3.6   7.1 
Coughing Average w/out O-mode 2.1   4.2 
Coughing Average, Infected Only 2.9   5.8 












 Sneezing Average 154.5   NA 
 Sneezing Average, Excluding Unimodal distribution 51.7   NA 
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The table lists different measured droplet / aerosol (particle) diameter ranges (first column) associated 
with a specific expiratory means (second column) pulled from the various studies referenced in the last 
column. Within that overall range, as provided by the studies, the subsequent series of paired columns 
list a) calculated GMs (geometric mean diameters) for various bins of particle size ranges and b) an 
associated percentage. This percentage consists of either a) the percentage of infectious particles within 
the bin relative to the infectious particles from the overall particle size range or b) the percentage 
concentration of particles within the bin relative to the concentration of particles from the overall 
particle size range. For the referenced studies where it was possible, these series of paired columns are 
used to calculate the weighted average GM (third column from the end) using the following method9. 
The percentages of infectious particles contained within each associated bin of droplet / aerosol 
(particle) distribution ranges were multiplied by the GM from each of these bins, and then these 
products added together to get the weighted average GM for each referenced study. 
However, because only a few studies involved infected volunteers, additional studies involving healthy 
individuals also had to be referenced. In these cases, the percentage concentration for each bin of 
droplet / aerosol size ranges as opposed to the percentage of infectious particles contained within each 
bin was used to determine the weighted average GM. Most of the studies reported equilibrium sizes for 
the droplet / aerosol size ranges (or were assumed to), which are the size of droplets / aerosols after 
reaching equilibrium with environmental conditions, primarily driven by RH.38 To estimate the initial 
weighted average GM (the last column), the equilibrium sizes were divided by an evaporation factor of 
0.5.33 
For each expiratory means, the size values from the relevant studies were averaged together to reach 
the final weighted average values used by the model. Where possible, the final selected average was 
determined from studies making use of only infected individuals. O-mode size distribution ranges were 
excluded due to available research suggesting greater concentrations of viral particles occur in smaller 
droplets / aerosols.14,27,30,31,34,35,39,40,41 These and other averages discarded for use in the model are 
crossed out in the table. In order to coordinate with the quanta generation by expiratory means 
(discussed above), speaking loudly and singing were combined into a single expiratory event, using the 
initial droplet / aerosol diameters for speaking loudly. 
To calculate the settling removal efficiency (Esettling), the initial and equilibrium droplet / aerosol 
diameters are needed. As discussed above, Table 3 provides the average initial droplet / aerosol 
diameters used by this model. Equilibrium particle diameters are then calculated using an average of the 
model-based experimentally derived respiratory droplet size transformation ratios (the last column in 
Table 4) that corresponds to the relevant room RH, shown in Table 4.38  
Table 4: Respiratory droplet / aerosol size transformation average Deq/Di ratios 
RH 




ratios Di = 0.1 μm Di = 1.0 μm Di = 10.0 μm 
10% 0.401 0.402 0.402 0.391 0.399 
20% 0.407 0.407 0.407 0.395 0.404 
30% 0.412 0.412 0.412 0.398 0.409 
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40% 0.416 0.417 0.417 0.401 0.413 
50% 0.422 0.423 0.424 0.427 0.424 
60% 0.429 0.431 0.432 0.437 0.432 
70% 0.439 0.443 0.444 0.449 0.444 
80% 0.456 0.464 0.465 0.464 0.462 
90% 0.49 0.513 0.516 0.502 0.505 
 
Settling velocities are calculated referencing particle densities42 and the Stokes Law formula;38 v = (g * 
Deq * ⍴) / (18 * μ); g = gravitational acceleration, ⍴ = particle density, μ = dynamic viscosity of air. The 
final formula for ksettling is Equation (3). 
● ksettling =  v/H                                                                                                                             (3) 
○ v = settling velocity 
○ H = height of the room/space 
Ventilation removal factor 
Ventilation refers to the introduction of outside air into a space. It has the impact of diluting 
contaminants, including virus-containing aerosols, which in turn increases the amount of time required 
to inhale an infectious dose of virus. The continued introduction of outside air also displaces the same 
amount of air within the space, removing contaminants in the process, though due to mixing it is not an 
immediate one to one replacement.8,27,43 
Ventilation may be supplied mechanically through HVAC systems or naturally through operable windows 
or other intentional or unintentional openings in the building envelope. Recommended ventilation rates 
will vary depending on factors such as the space or facility type, the activities being conducted, and the 
density of people present. Ventilation removal efficiency (Eventilation) is dependent on ventilation rates for 
the room/space in question and entered as the total OA (outside air) in cubic feet per minute (cfm). 
kventilation equates to the outside air changes per hour for the room/space, calculated using the entered 
OA per space and the space volume. Design ventilation rates are often not readily available unless one 
has access to as-built drawings and actual ventilation rates will often vary from design ventilation rates. 
Engineers, commissioning agents, and/or test and balance (TAB) consultants may need to be consulted 
to verify actual ventilation rates or determine a close approximation. 
Filtration removal factor – filters inside building systems 
Filtration refers to a physical medium used to “capture” contaminants, including droplets / aerosols, 
from the air as it passes through the medium. For building systems, filters follow a Minimum Efficiency 
Reporting Values (MERV) rating system, with values ranging from 1 on the low end all the way up to 16. 
The ratings provide an indication of how effective a filter is at removing particles of varying size ranges 
out of the air.8,9,44 Filtration is effective if a) the contaminants are airborne, such as virus-containing 
aerosols, and b) the clean air delivery is high enough.8,9,45,46,47 Clean air delivery is a function of the 
filter’s efficiency and the recirculated air rate.  
The building system filter removal efficiency (ηfilter) percentages for various MERV and HEPA ratings used 
are taken from aerosol-weighted values given in another source’s Table 4.9 The available MERV and 
HEPA input selections are limited to the levels used in this table. Users must select the value closest to 
11 | P a g e  
their existing and/or proposed conditions. Recirculated air changes per hour (λrecirculation), entered as CFM 
per space, are needed to calculate the overall filtration removal efficiency (Efiltration). The final formula for 
kfiltration is Equation (4). 
● kfiltration =  λrecirculation ∗  ηfilter                                                                           (4) 
○ λrecirculation = recirculated air changes per hour for the room/space 
○ ηfilter = building system filter removal efficiency 
As with ventilation rates, engineers, commissioning agents, and/or TAB consultants may need to be 
consulted to determine what filter rating and recirculated air rate should be used. 
Filtration removal factor - portable air cleaners 
Portable air cleaners are also available for use to supplement building system filtration and ventilation. 
Units sold in the U.S. should have a clean air delivery rate (CADR) corresponding to a recommended 
room volume. This model requires entering the CADR value of the unit(s) being used, and these ratings 
are typically provided by the manufacturer for smoke, dust, and pollen. Some research14,34,48,49 ,50 
suggests that a greater percentage of infectious viral particles (approximate 60% to over 90% for the 
studies referenced) are found in smaller droplets / aerosols, potentially 5 microns or less in diameter. 
This droplet / aerosol size range is more reflective of smoke and dust than pollen,51 therefore this model 
requires the average of the smoke and dust CADR rating be entered. 
The removal rate per portable air cleaner, λaircleaner, equals the CADR (clean air delivery rate) value from 
the manufacturer divided by the space volume (V),51 as shown in Equation (5). 
● λaircleaner =  CADR / V        (5) 
This value is then multiplied by the number of portable air cleaners being used per space to provide the 
total removal rate (1/h).  
Filtration removal factor - masks 
The last type of filtration accounted for by this model are masks, which block large droplets and filter a 
percentage of virus-containing aerosols from the air exhaled by an infected individual as well as from 
the surrounding air before they are inhaled by a non-infected individual.30,52 The efficiency of a mask, or 
the percentage of aerosols with virus particles filtered out, depends on a) the removal efficiency of the 
mask material itself relative to the different size distributions of droplets / aerosols and flow rate 
through the mask and b) the leakage that occurs around the mask edges.24,53,54,55,56,57,58,59  
Leakage is largely related to how well the mask fits a person. The pressure drop across the mask 
material also impacts its usability as the greater the pressure drop, the harder it is to breathe through. 
Greater pressure drops may also result in greater leakage rates, especially if the fit is poor because more 
particles will follow the path of least resistance through the gaps between the face and mask. The mask 
removal efficiency (Emask) is calculated looking at the following two components, added together. 
Mask removal efficiency, part 1: This part consists of the amount of droplets / aerosols removed from 
the room air by the masks of the non-infected individuals as they breath in (Equation (6) below) and is a 
small contribution compared to part 2. It is calculated using the mask effective efficiency (ηmask), the 
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number of non-infected individuals wearing them, and the estimated breathing generated air change 
rate across an individual mask of 1.2 cfm (2.0 m3/hr),56 as shown in Equation (6) 
mask removal for non − infected   =
( 





mask effective efficiency         (6)      
The estimated breathing generated air change rate used here represents respiration rates at rest. This 
model uses Mask Effective Efficiency (ηmask) values shown in Table 5 below (labelled Fitted Filtration 
Efficiency (%)). These come from a study54 that directly measured the fitted filtration efficiency (FEE), 
accounting for both mask efficiency and face seal leakage, or mask fit.  
In this study the FixTheMask add on consisted of a rubber band configuration mimicking the impacts of 
the FixTheMask mask fitter, resulting in a measured FFE of 78.2%. Another study60 actually tested the 
manufactured FixTheMask mask fitter on a procedure mask using a similar particle range as the above 
study, though manikins were used instead of an actual person. The effective mask efficiency, or fitted 
filtration efficiency, was found to be 94.9%. For the model, these two values were averaged, giving an 
FFE of 86.6%. 
Table 5: Filtration efficiencies and p scaling factor for masks used in this model54 
  
Fitted Filtration Efficiency (%) p scaling 
factor 0.2 μm - 0.3 μm 
No mask 0 0 
2-layer woven nylon mask w/ ear loops w/out aluminium nose bridge 44.7% 55.3% 
2-layer woven nylon mask w/ ear loops, w/ aluminium nose bridge 56.3% 43.7% 
2-layer woven nylon mask w/ ear loops, w/ aluminium nose bridge & 
1 nonwoven insert 74.4% 25.6% 
Cotton bandana, folded "bandit" style 49.0% 51.0% 
Single-layer woven polyester gaiter/neck cover 37.8% 62.2% 
Single-layer woven polyester/nylon mask w/ ties 39.3% 60.7% 
Nonwoven polypropylene mask w/ fixed ear loops 28.6% 71.4% 
3-layer woven cotton mask w/ ear loops 26.5% 73.5% 
Surgical mask w/ ties 71.5% 28.5% 
Procedure mask w/ ear loops 38.5% 61.5% 
Procedure mask w/ ear loops & 3D printed ear guard 61.7% 38.3% 
Procedure mask w/ ear loops & FixTheMask 86.6% 13.4% 
N95 98.4% 1.6% 
Mask removal efficiency, part 2: This part consists of the amount of droplets / aerosols removed by the 
masks from the air breathed out by the infected individual(s), before they enter the room air, as shown 
in Equation (7). 
● source reduction =  (mask effective efficiency ∗  % infected wearing a mask)  (7) 
The final formula for kmask is then Equation (8). 
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●  kmask =  (mask removal for non − infected +  source reduction)   (8) 
Inactivation – RH removal factor 
Inactivation refers to a process of rendering a virus non-infectious. This model focuses on two types of 
inactivation. The first is in relation to relative humidity (RH), as research indicates that for typical interior 
temperature ranges, most viruses, including membrane-bound viruses like SARS-CoV-2 and influenza, 
find low (< 40%) and high (>90%) RH levels more conducive to survival with increased decay rates 
occurring at intermediate RH levels.25,27,61,62,63 As droplets / aerosols evaporate after expiration, the 
concentration levels of proteins, salts, etc., within them increase, creating conditions unfavourable to 
the virus and likely speeding up its inactivation, though additional research is needed to understand the 
nuances of how this varies by virus type, strain, phenotypic characteristics, temperature, and specific 
respiratory fluid characteristics. For the purposes of this model, a linear relationship is assumed for 
influenza27 and SARS-CoV-2.64 
While temperature impacts virus inactivation,25 there doesn’t does not appear to be significant variation 
in virus decay over the narrow temperature setpoint range found in most occupied spaces, 68OF - 76OF 
(20OC - 24.4OC).27 For the purposes of the model, an interior temperature of 22.5°C (72.5°F) and 
associated dynamic viscosity of air of 1.83x10-5 is assumed. For SARS-CoV-2, an interior temperature of 
72OF (22.2 OC) is assumed to coordinate the constraints of the Department of Homeland Security 
calculator64 used to estimate the virus’ inactivation due to RH (discussed further below). These 
assumptions also coordinate with the interior temperature assumptions made for settling discussed 
above. 
The influenza A virus inactivation rate (kRHinactivationIVA) due to relative humidity (RH) entered is calculated 
using Equation (9)38              
● kRHinactivationIVA =  (0.0438 ∗  RH) –  0.00629                                                     (9) 
For SARS-CoV-2, the inactivation rate (kRHinactivationSC2) is calculated using Equation (10) 
● kRHinactivationSC2 =  (0.0135 ∗  RH) –  0.0028                                                                   
(10) 
The equation was developed using a web application developed by the Department of Homeland 
Security.64 Decay rates were determined using this calculator for a UV Index of 0 (inside) and an interior 
assumed temperature of 72OF (22.2OC) to correspond to assumptions made for influenza and droplet 
evaporation. Note that the Department of Homeland Security calculator only provided values between a 
RH of 20+% and 70%. Table 6 then converts these values to 1/min, which were then graphed and 
Equation (10) formulated for the 99% decay rate values.  
Table 6: SARS-CoV-2 inactivation / decay rate (min-1) 
 RH 50% Decay (min-1) 90% Decay (min-1) 99% Decay (min-1) 
21% 0.000406702 0.000122441 6.12205x10-5 
22% 0.001304121 0.000392711 0.000196356 
23% 0.002201673 0.000662954 0.000331477 
25% 0.003996803 0.001203369 0.000601685 
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30% 0.008503401 0.002556237 0.001277139 
35% 0.013020833 0.003903201 0.001953888 
40% 0.01754386 0.005257624 0.002628812 
45% 0.021929825 0.006613757 0.003306878 
50% 0.026455026 0.007974482 0.003977725 
55% 0.030864198 0.009310987 0.004655493 
60% 0.035460993 0.010683761 0.005324814 
65% 0.03968254 0.011990408 0.006016847 
70% 0.043859649 0.013333333 0.00669344 
 
Inactivation – upper room UVGI removal factor 
The second type of inactivation focused on in this model is Upper Room UVGI (ultraviolet germicidal 
irradiation). A sufficient dosage of ultraviolet radiation will inactivate viruses (by photochemical 
disruption of viral RNA upon absorbing UV photons), with the UV-C band of energy (wavelengths 
between 100 and 280 nm) having the greatest germicidal effect.43,65,66,67 Upper room applications of this 
technology make use of UV radiation generating lamp sources (low/medium pressure mercury vapor 
lamps or UVC-LEDs), either wall mounted or suspended from the ceiling, to irradiate upper air zones of 
individual spaces while shielding the lower occupied zones from harmful UV radiation.66,67,68,69,70,71 
Substantial evidence exists for the effectiveness of Upper Room UVGI systems in killing various 
pathogens, including coronaviruses.46,72  
Germicidal effectiveness of these systems is influenced by spatial configuration, the location, number, 
and power of the UV fixtures, relative humidity, the airflow and air mixing that occurs between the 
lower occupied zone and upper irradiated zone, and the type of pathogen and its source(s). Of all these 
influences, the air up flow rate perhaps has the most impact, as this determines the speed with which 
pathogens are carried up into the irradiated zone to be eliminated, as well as how long they are 
irradiated, impacting the dose received. However, this simplified model assumes a well-mixed condition 
and only indirectly accounts for the impact of the airflow rate and ACH (discussed further below). 
The upper room UVGI coefficient of inactivation (or removal factor) is calculated by multiplying the UVGI 
system's upper room average irradiance or fluency (E) by the relevant susceptibility parameter (Z) for 
either influenza or SARS-CoV-2,66,67,68,69,70,73,74,75,76,77 as shown in Equation (11) 
● [kUVGIinactivationIVA or kUVGIinactivationSC2]  =  E ∗  Z                                                  
(11) 
Sources, including the 2009 NIOSH application guideline, recommend that the upper room average 
irradiance (E) should generally fall within the range of 30 - 50 µW/cm2 for most pathogens.67,75 
But the final average value depends on the number of lamps, their individual output, fixture 
configuration, fixture layout, and room parameters. Measured and modelled values often fall below this 
range.67,70,75 It will likely be necessary to coordinate with a design engineer and/or manufacturer to 
determine an appropriate estimate for a given setting. For these calculations, the effective average 
irradiance (E) for the whole space is used instead of the upper room average irradiance and is estimated 
by multiplying the upper room average irradiance by the ratio of upper room volume to total room 
volume.75,78 Under well mixed conditions (obtained via ceiling fans, the building mechanical system, or 
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some combination), some research78 indicates the whole room average irradiance value adequately 
accounts for the effects of air turnover rates between the upper and lower zones for all fan speeds of 
conventional low-velocity ceiling fans. Though potential conditions of stagnation or greater than six 
ACH43 will likely produce results overestimating the effectiveness of the upper room UVGI system. 
Reported susceptibility parameter (Z), or UV rate constant, values (m2/J) for influenza A include 0.15,73 
0.27,79 0.29 at 25-27% RH,74 0.27 at 50-54% RH,74 and 0.22 at 81-84% RH.74 In order to tie the Z value to 
RH, the last three values were used; see Table 7 below. The second RH range column was added to tie it 
to the RH ranges accounted for by this model. 
Table 7: Estimated Z values for influenza aerosols determined at low, medium, and high relative 
humidity (modified from table 174) 
RH range (%) RH Range (%) 
Estimated Z 
Value (m2/J) 
95% Confidence Interval 
R2 
Lower Upper 
25 - 27 0% - 33% 0.29 0.27 0.31 0.985 
50 - 54 34% - 66% 0.27 0.26 0.31 0.991 
81 - 84 67% - 100% 0.22 0.21 0.23 0.992 
Reported susceptibility parameter (Z), or UV rate constant, values (m2/J) for SARS-CoV-2 include the 
suggestion16 for 0.377 (best-case) and 0.0377 m2/J (worst-case) and the suggestion72 of 0.05524 m2/J. At 
this point there are no known studies linking the susceptibility parameter (Z) for SARS-CoV-2 to RH, so 
for the purposes of this model, an average of 0.377 and 0.0377 m2/J was used (0.207 m2/J). 
The relationship between ACH, ventilation and UVGI is not fully understood.24 Greater ACH levels within 
lower ranges can positively impact room mixing, aiding in UVGI's effectiveness by increasing the 
percentage of pathogens exposed at a faster rate. But greater ACH rates also decrease its effectiveness 
relative to delivered dosage by decreasing the amount of exposure time for the pathogens in question. 
Future versions may look at incorporating these parameters, but for now the effective average 
irradiance for the whole space is used to partially account for not directly estimating the impacts of ACH 
or air turnover rates on delivered dosage, as discussed above.  
Adjusted vaccination factor 
The model also accounts for the impacts of vaccination for influenza. Default influenza U.S. coverage 
rates for children (57%) and adults (42%) are provided based on averages of nine consecutive flu 
seasons for each, calculated from data provided by the CDC.80 However, users of the model may modify 
these default values if desired. As COVID vaccinations are still rolling out and yet to be approved for 
children under 12 (as of this paper’s publication), local vaccination percentages are recommended to be 
used to guide the input for the percentage of adults and children 12 and over who are vaccinated. 
To integrate the impact of vaccination into these calculations, the relationship between the probability 
of infection calculated by this model and the basic reproduction number, R0 is used. R0 is "... defined as 
the expected number of secondary cases produced by a single (typical) infection in a completely 
susceptible population,"81 and the probability of infection is one of three factors multiplied by each 
other to calculate R0. 
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The impact of vaccination on the reproduction number can be estimated using Equation (12). 
● R0p =  (1 − p)  ∗  R0                                                                                                                        (12) 
"where R0p is the R0 under vaccination and p is the vaccination coverage rate of the population who have 
been vaccinated."11 This model uses the relationship between R0 and the probability of infection to 
estimate the impact of vaccination on the probability of infection, essentially multiplying it by (1-p). As 
vaccinations are not 100% effective, the p value for children and adults is also multiplied by estimates of 
influenza vaccination effectiveness for children (0.70) and adults (0.62).82 This provides the adjusted 
vaccination factor (vadjusted) applicable for influenza. 
For SARS-CoV-2, adult efficacy percentages for the most prominent vaccines are listed in Table 8 (also 
used as a proxy for those 12 to 15 years of age as of this paper’s publication. These have been obtained 
from the sources listed for each vaccine. As indicated in the table, the efficacies for Johnson and 
Johnson were determined for both moderate to severe and severe symptoms. Cells with dashes indicate 
no formal efficacy values are available at this point. Though preliminary data does indicate the efficacy 
of the Pfizer and Moderna vaccines is less for the variants. Due to limited data and uncertainty regarding 
the variants, it was decided to use one estimated efficacy value, averaging all of the percentages listed 
in Table 8 together, resulting in a value of 0.80. As more efficacy data becomes available, the model will 
be updated. The model currently does not allow one to account for any immunity generated through 
previous community infections. In those cases where a large number of such individuals (who are also 
unvaccinated) may be present within a building population, the results will overestimate the probability 
of infection to an unknown degree. 
Table 8: SARS-CoV-2 Vaccine Efficacy 
Vaccine 
Adults 


































94.8% -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Moderna83,84 94.1% -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Johnson and 
Johnson83,85 
72.0% 85.0% -- 85.0% 57.0% 85.0% 66.0% 85.0% 
Novovax86 95.6% 85.6% 60.0% -- -- 
Overall Average 80.4% 
 
Validation of model against previous infection cases 
To demonstrate the strengths and weaknesses of the web application1 and its underlying model, it has 
been used to model the outcomes of two documented superspreading events: the Skagit Valley Chorale 
Superspreading Event21 and the Guangzhou Restaurant Event.87,88,89  
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Skagit Valley chorale superspreading event 
In March of 2021, a COVID-19 outbreak occurred as the result of a choral practice at the Mount Vernon 
Presbyterian Church in Skagit Valley, Washington, U.S. One symptomatic individual attended the choral 
practice which included a total of 61 vocalists. After the practice, 53 members were confirmed through 
testing or were strongly suspected of as having contracted COVID-19 from reported symptoms. A 
detailed analysis of this likely superspreading event was previously performed,21 assuming transmission 
was predominantly via virus-containing aerosols and using gathered data to infer the quanta generation 
rate of aerosols emitted by the infected individual. Based on this previous analysis and data gathered to 
perform it the following parameters were entered into the model. 
Rehearsal hall room size: 1,937.5 ft2 (180 m2), 14.76 ft (4.5 m) ceiling.21  
Design OA: 1,236 cfm (2,100 m3/hr). The referenced analysis21 used ASHRAE Standard 62.1 and existing 
mechanical drawings to estimate the design ventilation, or outside air (OA), for the rehearsal hall. 
Design RA: 3,473 cfm (5,900 m3/hr). The referenced analysis21 used ASHRAE Standard 62.1 and existing 
mechanical drawings to estimate the design recirculated air (RA) for the rehearsal hall. 
Choir practice OA: 334 cfm (567 m3/hr), +/- 50% uncertainty: 167 cfm (284 m3/hr) – 501 cfm (850 
m3/hr). Based on the data gathered, the referenced analysis21 assumed the HVAC fan wasn’t operating 
during the choir practice, providing no mechanical outside or recirculated air (the body heat from the 
number of choir members present was sufficient to maintain a comfortable temperature). Based on the 
delta between exterior and interior temperatures during the practice, the estimated body heat 
generated by individual choir members, and the heat capacity of air, an estimate was made by the 
referenced analysis21 of the amount of outside air that entered via infiltration, along with values 
representative of +/- 50% uncertainty. 
Choir practice RA: 0 cfm (0 m3/hr).21 The system was not running at the time of the event. 
Furnace filter: MERV 11.21 
Temperature: Thermostat setting: 68 OF (20 OC), assumed interior temperature: 71 OF (22 OC), 
determined from gathered data.21 The interior temperature fits within the 68OF - 76OF (20OC - 24.4OC) 
that this model is currently optimized for. 
Relative humidity (RH): 30% RH. No RH information for the rehearsal hall room during the practice was 
provided.21 Nor was the use of any type of humidifier indicated. As the heater had been on to warm the 
space before choir members arrived, the air was assumed to be at a lower humidity than if the heater 
had not been running. Deviations from this estimation are discussed below. 
Number of infected individuals: 1. The referenced analysis21 made this estimation based on one choir 
member having “cold-like” symptoms manifesting three days prior to the practice and subsequently 
testing positive for COVID-19.  
Viral shedding level: High. Referencing other published analyses of COVID-19’s incubation time, the 
referenced analysis21 estimates that such a high secondary attack rate resulting from one infected 
person would require high shedding of the virus by the infected individual.  
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Activity level: Light. Choral members were generally sitting while practicing with some limited standing 
and walking.21 Holding music and singing while sitting would be more along the lines of office work as 
opposed to passively sitting while resting. Therefore a “light” activity level was selected, which would 
also encompass standing and leisurely walking for short distances. 
Number of choral members present: 61.21 This includes the infected individual. 
Expiratory Means / Exposure Time: The following breakdown was selected for this analysis. The 
probability of infection was calculated for each time period and the net probability of infection 
determined from these three individual values. 
● Singing / 126 minutes (2.1 hours) 
● Speaking / 18 minutes (0.3 hours) 
● Breathing Only / 6 minutes (0.1 hours) 
The total rehearsal time was determined to be 2.5 hours,21 broken up as follows:  
● Phase 1: 45 minutes with the 61 choral members all together in the Fellowship Hall. This time 
was spent primarily practicing with a brief amount of time transitioning to the next phase. 
● Phase 2: 45 minutes spent primarily practicing in two groups. Group 1 consisted of 
approximately 35 people practicing in the Fellowship Hall and group 2 consisted of 
approximately 26 people practicing in the sanctuary. The infected person was part of Group 1. 
● Break: 10 minutes with everyone talking and eating snacks. 
● Phase 3: 50 minutes with the 61 choral members practicing all together in the Fellowship Hall. 
To simplify the analysis, Phase 2 was modelled as the same conditions in Phase 1. This was decided due 
to a) lacking dimensional and ventilation information for the sanctuary and b) the infected person being 
part of the group practicing in the Fellowship Hall. In addition, an average amount of time of singing vs 
speaking vs breathing over the 2.5 hours was estimated referencing the answers provided by the choir 
spokesperson.21 
Table 9 provides a) the resulting probability of infections calculated using this model, given the above 
estimations and b) the potential resulting number of additional people infected given the net probability 
of infection. The probability of infection for the three different expiratory means / exposure times are 
listed as well as the resulting net probability (the chance that at least one of these three conditions 
occurs). The net probability is calculated as shown in Equation (13). 
● NPI =  (PIsinging +  PIspeaking +  PIbreathing)  −  (PIsinging ∗  PIspeaking)  −
 (PIsinging ∗  PIbreathing)  −  (PIspeaking ∗  PIbreathing) + (PIsinging ∗  PIspeaking ∗
 PIbreathing)           (13) 
○ NPI = Net Probability of Infection 
○ PIsinging = Probability of Infection - Singing 
○ PIspeaking = Probability of Infection - Speaking 
○ PIbreathing = Probability of Infection - Breathing 
The number of additional people infected is 60 uninfected individuals multiplied by the net probability 
of infection. 
Table 9: Probability of infections and resulting additional choral members potentially infected. 
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Choral Practice Conditions Design OA & RA 
OA - 167 cfm 
(284 m3/hr) 
OA - 334 cfm 
(567 m3/hr) 
OA - 501 cfm 
(850 m3/hr) 
OA - 1236 cfm (2,100 m3/hr); 
RA - 3,473 cfm (5,900 m3/hr) 
Probability of Infection - Singing 96.0% 83.8% 71.8% 16.8% 
Probability of Infection - Speaking 5.5% 3.1% 2.2% 0.3% 
Probability of Infection - 
Breathing 
0.5% 0.3% 0.2% 0.0% 
Net Probability of Infection 96.2% 84.3% 72.5% 17.0% 
Number of Additional Infected 58 51 43 10 
Normalized Error 7.9% -4.0% -15.9% --------- 
  
For the estimated ventilation of 334 cfm (567 m3/hr), the resulting net probability of infection was 
estimated to be 84.3%, or an estimated 51 additional infected individuals. This is two less than the likely 
53 additional choral members infected. Results are also provided for the +/- 50% uncertainty ventilation 
rates, giving potential numbers of additional infected individuals of 58 and 43 respectively for the low 
and high ventilation rates. The difference, or error, between the predicted and actual number of 
additional people infected, normalized by the total number of uninfected people initially present is also 
provided. This error was normalized using the total number of uninfected people initially present. In 
addition, for comparison purposes, results are also provided for the design ventilation and recirculated 
air rates. If the furnace had been running, providing these design rates, the model estimates a net 
probability of infection of only 17%, or 10 additional people potentially infected. 
The results provided in Table 9 are based on a RH of 30%, though it’s possible the RH varied from this 
depending on how much the furnace dried the air out prior to the practice and how rapidly the RH 
subsequently increased after the furnace was shut off. To account for this, Figure 1 shows the potential 
number of additional people infected for 20% RH, 30% RH, and 40% RH. 
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Figure 1: The potential number of additional people infected depending on ventilation and RH. 
Depending on the actual choir practice ventilation rate and interior RH (ranging from 20% to 40%), the 
model’s normalized error output ranges in underestimating the probability of infection and resulting 
number of people potentially infected by 18.4% to overestimating them by 9.7%. If we assume that 334 
cfm (567 m3/hr) is very close to the actual choir practice ventilation rate, then the model’s normalized 
error output ranges in underestimating these values from 6.9% to 1.3%. So overall: 
● Normalized error range for all ventilation rates: -18.4% to 9.7% 
● Normalized error range for 334 cfm (567 m3/hr) outside air: -6.9% to -1.3% 
Guangzhou restaurant event 
On January 24, 2020, a spreading event is thought to have occurred at an unnamed restaurant in 
Guangzhou, China.87,88 It occurred on the third floor of the restaurant in question, where a single index 
case is thought to have infected nine additional patrons out of a total of 89 patrons present for between 
53 and 75 minutes. Masks were not worn. Based on the associated epidemiological data, data gathered 
on the restaurant and its operations, as well as an analysis involving tracer gas and computer simulation, 
the following parameters were entered into the model. 
Dining room size: The estimated area and ceiling heights are taken directly from the referenced 
analyses.87,88 Scenario 1 examines the whole third floor dining area. Scenario 2 only looks at the air 
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conditioning zone within which the infections occurred. No patrons outside of this particular zone ended 
up being infected. Within the dining room there are five ceiling mounted fan-coil air conditioning units 
located along one of the long walls, each serving a separate “zone” within the room, with its own supply 
and return at the unit. While there are no physical barriers between the zones to prevent air mixing 
across the zones, the air flow from the supply out across the width of the room and then back to the 
return does limit some of the mixing. In addition, the zone in which the infections occurred was also at 
the far end of the room, further isolating it from the other zones. As this model assumes droplets / 
aerosols are instantaneously, continuously, and evenly distributed throughout the room upon 
expiration, applying it to the whole dining space may be too great a simplification to accurately predict 
the probability of infection given the limitations on air mixing between the zones. Therefore, an analysis 
is also run on the one zone only where the infections occurred. This results in the two scenarios being 
analysed. 
● Scenario 1: 1,482.2 ft2 (137.7 m2), 10.3 ft (3.14 m) ceiling.  
● Scenario 2: 193.8 ft2 (18 m2), 10.3 ft (3.14 m) ceiling. 
Ventilation OA: Ventilation in the space was apparently limited to brief, infrequent openings of the fire 
door and infiltration due to negative air pressure created by the restroom exhaust fan running.88 While 
the dining space had wall mounted exhaust fans to promote ventilation they were turned off during the 
period in question. And the five fan-coil air conditioning units serving the dining space did not supply 
outdoor air - they are recirculating only units. Based on the tracer gas analysis,88 the air changes per 
hour (ACH) during the period in question was estimated to be between 0.56 and 0.77. These values 
along with the volume of the dining space for each scenario were used to determine the following cfm 
ranges. 
● Scenario 1: 142 cfm (242 m3/hr) - 196 cfm (333 m3/hr) 
● Scenario 2: 18.6 cfm (31.7 m3/hr) - 25.6 cfm (43.5 m3/hr) 
Recirculated air (RA): Unfortunately, no detailed information on the fan-coil air conditioning units was 
provided. Based on the image in a letter response from one of the analyses,89 these appear to be 
cassette fan-coil units in a chilled water DX split system. To estimate the recirculated air supplied by 
each unit, a design ventilation rate was first estimated using ASHRAE 62.1. Based on the square footage 
of the dining space, this rate is determined to be 1,045 cfm (1,776 m3/hr) for the whole dining area. A 
rough rule of thumb is that ventilation air is 20% of the total supply air. As the recirculated air is total 
supply air minus ventilation air, RA is then estimated at 4,180 cfm (7,102 m3/hr) using this rule of thumb.  
The ESACIR horizontal concealed ceiling exposed cassette chilled water fan coil unit, by Shenzhen 
Eurostars Technology Co., Ltd.,90 is likely similar to the fan coil unit depicted in the image referenced 
above.89 From the drawings/plans in one of the referenced analyses,88 there may have been two 
different sizes of units. Using the listed high air flow ratings for a 2-pipe system, (3) of the 1000HC2 units 
(1,000 cfm / 1,700 m3/hr) and (2) of the 600HC2 units (600 cfm / 1,020 m3/hr) would satisfy the RA 
calculated above. As the speed these units were likely running at was not reported, the medium 
speed/airflow setting was decided for this analysis. And per the above drawings/plans, the air-flow zone 
where the infections occurred was served by one of the larger units. Therefore, the RA is estimated to 
be as follows for each scenario: 
● Scenario 1: 3,161 cfm (5,370 m3/hr) 
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● Scenario 2: 753 cfm (1,280 m3/hr) 
Fan coil unit filter: MERV 4 for both scenarios. For the ESACIR unit mentioned above, a washable filter is 
listed as optional. Such filters typically have a MERV rating of 1 to 4. Other similar cassette fan coil units 
may accept disposable filters ranging in MERV ratings from 1 to 13, though ratings above 4 typically 
require the addition of a filter box. It doesn’t appear in the image89 referenced above that a filter box is 
included with the unit, so it is unlikely a filter with a MERV rating greater than 4 was present. As a result 
of field measurements and computer simulations, the study88 reported a filtration efficiency of 20% for 
an aerosol diameter of 5 μm, which would suggest the presence of a MERV 4 or equivalent filter.9,8 Each 
scenario is therefore run using a MERV 4 filter. 
Temperature: No information was given on the interior temperature in any of the referenced analyses. 
87,88,89 The interior temperature was assumed within the 68OF - 76OF (20OC - 24.4OC) that this model is 
currently optimized for. 
Relative humidity (RH): 40% RH for both scenarios. No information was given on the RH in any of the 
referenced analyses.,87,88,89 As the air conditioning fan coil units were running with very little outside air 
provided, the RH humidity was assumed to have been lower than the exterior average 72% RH for this 
time of year in Guangzhou, somewhere between 30% and 50%. While the analysis could have been run 
for 30%, 40%, and 50%, based on the limited impact of RH within a similar range on the previous Skagit 
Valley chorale superspreading event analysis, it was decided to focus only on 40% RH to simplify the 
analysis. 
Number of infected individuals: One for both scenarios. As reported in the referenced analyses, 87,88 one 
infected individual sitting at the middle table of the air-flow zone in which all of the infections occurred 
served as the infected person.  
Viral shedding level: High for both scenarios. This person was reported to have developed symptoms 
later that day, so this person appears to have been pre-symptomatic while dining in the restaurant. It 
has been reported that patients may be most infectious in the initial period after infection, before or 
shortly after symptoms emerge.91,92,93 For these reasons, the authors of the study88 estimated that the 
index case had a “relative large quanta generation rate” while dining. This study followed their lead and 
used the high shedder condition for the index case. 
Activity level: Light. Sitting while talking and eating would be more along the lines of office work as 
opposed to passively sitting while resting. Therefore a “light” activity level was selected. 
Number of patrons present: For the purposes of this analysis, waiters and other restaurant staff are 
excluded from the analysis, as they were not consistently present within the dining area. The study88 
reported 89 patrons were present during the time in question, and that 21 patrons sat within the airflow 
zone in which the infections occurred. In addition, nine patrons were infected as a result of this incident, 
all sitting at the tables encompassed within Scenario 2. No indication of adults versus children among 
the patrons was provided so it is assumed these are all adults. Therefore, the number of patrons for 
each scenario consists as follows:  
● Scenario 1: 89 patrons, including the single infected person and the nine additional infected 
individuals. 
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● Scenario 2: 21 patrons, including the single infected person and the nine additional infected 
individuals. 
Expiratory means / exposure time: The following breakdown was selected for this analysis. The 
probability of infection was calculated for each time period and the net probability of infection 
determined from these three individual values. 
● Speaking Loudly: 6 minutes (0.1 hours) 
● Speaking: 24 minutes (0.4 hours) 
● Breathing (Listening/Eating/Drinking): 36 minutes (0.6 hours) 
The time of exposure reported in the referenced analyses,87,88 was only for the three tables located in 
the airflow zone in which the infections occurred. Three families occupied these three tables at the 
following times - Table A: 12:01 - 13:23, Table B: 11:37 - 12:54, and Table C: 12:03 - 13:18. The infected 
person sat at Table A, overlapping with Table B by 53 minutes and with Table C by 75 minutes. Averaging 
the (2) times together results in 64 minutes, which is rounded up to 66 minutes to equate to an even 1.1 
hours of exposure time. The amount of time Table A overlapped with the remaining 68 patrons is 
unknown, so 1.1 hours is used as an approximation. 
Little information in the referenced analyses87,88 is provided on the expiratory means, and these patrons 
were assumed to have spent their time in the restaurant breathing, eating/drinking, speaking, and 
potentially speaking loudly. For the purposes of this analysis, breathing is assumed to expel a similar 
quantity and size distribution of virus-containing aerosols as eating/drinking, though this may 
underestimate the amount produced. Little research in general appears to exist quantifying the amount 
of a group mealtime spent eating/drinking vs speaking vs listening/breathing.  
For the 66 minutes, it is assumed that 24 minutes are spent speaking/listening and waiting for the food 
to be served, 30 minutes are spent eating/drinking and speaking/listening, and 12 minutes are spent 
speaking/listening after eating (see Figure 2). For the combined 36 minutes spent just speaking and 
listening/breathing, it is assumed that 18 minutes are spent speaking and 18 minutes are spent 
listening/breathing. And 6 of the 18 minutes is assumed to be spent speaking more loudly. For the 30 
minutes spent eating/drinking and speaking/listening, it is assumed that 18 minutes are spent 
eating/drinking/breathing and listening/breathing and 12 minutes spent speaking. 
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Figure 2: Expiratory means / exposure time (in minutes) estimations for the Guangzhou restaurant event 
analysis 
Table 10 provides a) the resulting probability of infections and b) the potential number of additional 
people infected given the net probability of infection. The probability of infection for the three different 
expiratory means / exposure times are listed as well as the resulting net probability (the chance that at 
least one of these three conditions occurs). The number of additional people infected is the net 
probability of infection multiplied by 88 uninfected individuals (for scenario 1) and 20 uninfected 
individuals (for scenario 2). 
Table 10: Probability of infections and resulting additional patrons potentially infected 
Scenario Scenario 1 - Whole Restaurant Scenario 2 - Airflow Zone of Infection 
Ventilation 142 cfm (242 
m3/hr) 
196 cfm (333 
m3/hr) 
18.6 cfm (31.7 
m3/hr) 
25.6 cfm (43.5 
m3/hr) 
MERV Filter Level 4 4 4 4 
Virus Shedding Level High High High High 
25 | P a g e  
  Probability of Infection - 
Speaking Loudly 
6.0% 5.4% 26.4% 25.0% 
  Probability of Infection - 
Speaking 
2.9% 2.7% 13.7% 13.0% 
 Probability of Infection - 
Breathing 
1.2% 1.1% 5.9% 5.6% 
Net Probability of Infection 9.8% 9.0% 40.2% 38.4% 
Number of Additional Infected 9 8 8 8 
Normalized Error: 9 More Infected -0.4% -1.3% -4.8% -6.6% 
 
If the estimations are generally correct, then for scenario 1 the model’s normalized error output ranges 
from -1.3% to -0.4%, underestimating the number of resulting people infected by one or accurately 
estimating it, depending on the ventilation rates, given the total number of uninfected patrons present 
in the room. For scenario 2 the model’s normalized error output ranges from -6.6% to -4.8% 
underestimating the number of additional people by one for both ventilation rates, given the total 
number of uninfected patrons present in this zone. So overall:  
● Scenario 1 Normalized Error Range: -1.3% to -0.4% 
● Scenario 2 Normalized Error Range: -6.6% to -4.8% 
Interestingly, the model’s estimated number of people potentially infected was close to the actual 
number of patrons infected for both scenarios. As discussed above, the air circulation created by each 
fan coil unit limited the flow of aerosols across airflow zones, contributing to the resulting additional 
infections only occurring within the single airflow zone with the index case. That would suggest this 
model, which assumes aerosols are instantaneously, continuously, and evenly distributed throughout 
the space being analysed, should be better aligned with scenario 2 than scenario 1. The probability of 
infections for scenario 2 should better reflect the actual conditions for that airflow zone than the 
probability of infections for scenario 1 reflect the actual conditions for the entire space. 
If this is the case, the fact that the model’s analysis of scenario 1 produced results closely aligned with 
the actual range of additional individuals infected is likely a coincidence partially driven by the number 
of patrons present in this case study. For example, instead of 20 uninfected patrons in scenario 2, 
assume nine uninfected patrons were actually present. Then the resulting potential number of 
additional patrons infected would be three at 25.6 cfm (43.5 m3/hr) of ventilation. For scenario 1, using 
77 uninfected patrons for the whole dining space (11 subtracted from 88), the resulting potential 
number of additional people infected would be seven at 196 cfm (333 m3/hr) of ventilation. In this case 
there is a greater difference between the two scenarios, and scenario 2 likely represents the more 
accurate assessment of the model’s capabilities. 
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Limitations 
There are a number of limitations associated with the model itself, as well as the efforts to validate it. 
Looking specifically at the model’s major limitations, it estimates the probability of infection from 
airborne transmission only, excluding other routes of transmission such as fomite and direct contact. In 
addition, the model assumes that the virus-containing aerosols are evenly distributed throughout the 
space immediately after leaving an infected individual and that the room is a well-mixed condition, with 
the resulting probability of infection representing an average across the room or space being analysed. It 
is therefore most applicable for assessing the risk from far-field virus-containing aerosols; it 
underestimates the risk from near-field virus-containing aerosols that occur at a greater density than the 
far-field aerosols. 
In addition, the quantum generation rates are estimates for many of the listed activity levels and degree 
of shedding, particularly relative to SARS-CoV-2. As more research is conducted, these values will need 
to be updated based on what is learned. In addition, due to conflicting data and opinions in the research 
relative to varying quantum generation rates between adults and children,11,12 the model currently 
assumes the same rate for both children and adults. 
While the model provides the ability to account for more than one infected individual, it does not allow 
the user to vary the expiratory means, activity level, quantum of infection, pulmonary ventilation rate, 
or child versus adult among the infected individuals. The same is generally true for the susceptible 
individuals, with a few exceptions focused on age. 
The model does allow one to differentiate between children and adults for the susceptible individuals, 
but this distinction is limited to two categories: those less than 18 years of age and those 18 and over. 
Further variation relative to such factors as pulmonary ventilation (breathing), vaccination rates, etc. are 
found within each of these two broad categories that are currently not accounted for. 
The model does not currently allow one to modify temperature, and it is optimized for interior 
temperatures between 68OF - 76OF (20OC - 24.4OC). Applying it to other temperature conditions will 
decrease the model’s accuracy. Future versions will look at incorporating the ability to modify 
temperature. Mask selections are also limited to the 13 types listed in Table 5. 
It may be necessary to consult with various experts, such as consulting engineers, commissioning agents, 
TAB consultants, and/or manufacturers, to verify the most appropriate values to use for such inputs as 
ventilation rate, recirculated air rate, filter rating, the portable air cleaner’s CADR rating, RH, and the 
upper room UVGI system’s upper zone average irradiance or fluency value. 
In addition to hinging on using the most appropriate value for the upper room UVGI system’s upper 
zone average irradiance or fluency, the associated upper room UVGI system removal factor calculation is 
also dependent on the actual room conditions being well-mixed. Conditions of stagnation or high ACH 
will decrease the accuracy of the results. Future versions will look at improving the incorporation of the 
impacts of air flow. And at this point there are no known studies linking the susceptibility parameter (Z) 
for SARS-CoV-2 to RH. As future research illuminates this relationship, the model will need to be 
updated accordingly. 
Vaccine efficacy relative to preventing COVID-19 is still being assessed and the associated adjusted 
vaccination factor will need to be updated as our understanding of efficacy improves. Nor does the 
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model account for any immunity generated through previous community infections. In those cases 
where a large number of such individuals (who are also unvaccinated) may be present within a building 
population, the results will overestimate the probability of infection to an unknown degree. 
Despite these limitations, we have found the model quite useful in evaluating the relative impacts that 
different mitigation strategies included in the model have on reducing the risk of infection from SARS-
CoV-2 and influenza via an airborne transmission route. 
Turning to the validation exercises, in general there are a limited number of documented real-world 
events, or even controlled laboratory experiments, available for use to validate the model. For those 
that do exist, many of the parameters needed for the inputs of the model have not been recorded and 
are difficult to estimate (if estimating can be done at all). The studies for the two events selected have 
either verified or estimated most of the necessary inputs for this model and appear to have provided the 
best opportunity to validate the model using actual events. That being said, each event comes with its 
own set of limitations discussed below. 
Skagit Valley choral superspreading event 
The only estimation made that was not justified by information given in the referenced study21 itself was 
the 30% input value used for RH. As discussed above, the study did not provide any estimate of the 
rehearsal hall room’s RH during the event. As the heater had been running immediately prior to the 
choral practice, the interior humidity was estimated to be lower than 50% and the analysis was run for 
values of 20% RH, 30% RH, and 40% RH. Note that the results do not vary significantly between these 
three RH percentages.  
The expiratory means / exposure time input values were based directly on the information provided in 
the study and are discussed in detail above. However, the simplification made with respect to treating 
the phase 2 portion of the practice similar to the phase 1 portion could have some minimal impact on 
the results. This and the uncertainty regarding RH are the two weakest links in this analysis. The 
measurements and estimates made for the rehearsal hall room size, choir practice OA and RA, the 
interior temperature, number of infected individuals, viral shedding level, activity level, number of 
choral members present, and the number of resulting choral members infected are discussed in detail in 
the referenced study. These estimates have generally been well justified by the authors of this study. 
Guangzhou restaurant event 
Estimates had to be made for recirculated air, temperature, and RH with little justification given by the 
information in the referenced analyses.87,88,89 The justification for recirculated air and RH were provided 
in detail above. There is little justification available for the assumption that the temperature fell within 
the range optimized for this model. It, along with assigning exposure times to specific expiratory means 
discussed below, represent the weakest links relative to justifications. 
The expiratory means / exposure time input values were based directly on the information provided in 
the referenced analyses and are discussed in detail above. However, there was little to go on to assign 
specific exposure times to each expiratory method, relying primarily on the authors’ own experiences. If 
actual times varied significantly from what was assumed, it could have a noticeable impact on the 
results. The measurements and estimates made for the dining room size, ventilation OA, fan coil unit 
filter, number of infected individuals, viral shedding level, activity level, number of patrons present, and 
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resulting number of patrons infected are discussed in detail in the referenced analyses. And these 
estimates have been well justified by the authors of these analyses. 
One of the largest questions posed by running an analysis of the Guangzhou restaurant event relative to 
the model’s assumptions was whether to focus on the entire third floor dining area or only on the single 
airflow zone with the index case. The latter was likely a closer approximation to a well-mixed 
environment than the former, and the results of the analysis appeared to support the notion that model 
applications suffer if the actual environment deviates significantly from well-mixed conditions. 
While there are limitations relative to the certainty of some of the inputs for these two events, in the 
authors’ opinions, they nevertheless validate the generally applicability of the model if its major 
assumptions are closely met. However, there are several other aspects of the model that still require 
testing if appropriate documented real-world events or controlled laboratory experiments are found. 
These include validating the model’s treatment of portable air cleaners, upper room UVGI systems, 
mask wearing, vaccination, children, and the quanta estimates for influenza. 
Conclusion 
At the beginning of the pandemic in early 2020, there was an expressed need from various building 
owners, facility managers, occupants, and AEC industry consultants to help evaluate the relative 
contribution of different interior COVID-19 risk mitigation strategies. There was a lack of easily 
accessible tools and other resources for comparing and ranking different solutions (e.g., increased 
ventilation, filtration, mask wearing, de-densifying, UV technologies, etc.) for a given context based on 
both removal efficiency and the probability of infection. This web application1 and its underlying model 
were developed specifically to contextually compare and rank available influenza and SARS-CoV-2 
mitigation strategies for making our built environments safer.  
In this paper, the authors have provided a detailed overview of the underlying model’s removal and 
inactivation mechanisms and its specific model of infection, including required inputs, associated 
assumptions and their justifications as well as the associated limitations. The model was also validated 
against two documented spreading events to assess its effectiveness, with the normalized errors for 
both analyses as follows: 
● Skagit Valley Chorale Normalized Error Range for all Ventilation Rates: -18.4% to +9.7% 
● Skagit Valley Chorale Normalized Error Range for 334 cfm (567 m3/hr) Outside Air: -6.9% to -
1.3% 
● Guangzhou Restaurant Normalized Error Range for Scenario 2: -6.6% to -4.8% 
For conditions that generally meet the constraints of the model, these two analyses suggest that the 
error between modelled and actual number of additional people infected, normalized by the number of 
uninfected people present, will range from roughly -18.4% to +9.7%. The more certain one can be 
regarding the input parameters (such as ventilation rates), the smaller these normalized errors will likely 
be, potentially under 2% as indicated in looking at the range above for the most likely Skagit Valley 
ventilation rate of 334 cfm (567 m3/hr). In addition, the farther actual conditions vary from a box 
configuration, from an instantaneous, continuous, and even distribution of aerosols, and/or from a 
temperature range of 68OF - 76OF (20OC - 24.4OC), the less applicable this model will be to analysing 
those conditions. 
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This suggests the model is appropriate to use when its limitations are adequately accounted for and 
input parameters can be accurately determined. Design team members, commissioning agents, building 
owners, or facility managers attempting to use this tool to assess existing buildings or new designs have 
a much larger potential to accurately verify input parameters compared to modelling past events, some 
of which occurred in other countries. The results of such analyses are then more likely to have less 
errors than the results presented here. 
But additional validation of the Facility Infection Risk Estimator™1 and its underlying model against 
events including other parameters would be useful. Events involving children or children and adults, 
varying degrees of mask wearing, activity levels other than light, portable filter units, upper room UVGI 
systems, and influenza instead of SARS-CoV-2 would provide further useful validation. In addition to 
looking for other events to analyse, the model could also be validated against the monitored 
effectiveness of mitigation strategies that have been implemented. Opportunities for further 
development of the model include parameters for SARS-CoV-2 variants, updated data on COVID-19 
vaccinations, updated research on masks, updated research on SARS-CoV-2 quanta generation rates, as 
well as similar updated data/research on influenza. 
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